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THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NAVAHO, 1846-1858
By FRANK D. REEVE
HE NAVAJOES have been at open war with the inT
habitants of this country for twelve years interrupted by intervals of brief and treacherous peace. They
are a warlike and wealthy tribe, there being many individuals among them whose wealth is estimated as far exceeding
that of anyone person in this Territory. Their principal
wealth consists of immense herds of horses, mules, sheep,
and cattle. The country which they inhabit is mountainous
and rugged, and there are many places to which they can
retreat in times of danger, which are described as almost
inaccessible. These Indians have permanent villages,! and
cultivate all the grains and fruits known to the Spaniard in
this climate. They manufacture blankets of rare beauty
and excellence and are acquainted with the use of money.
The depredations of these Indians have of late years been
confined to the Spanish settlements on the Rio del Norte
from Santa Fe to Socorro, from which they have annually
driven off immense flocks of sheep, cattle, horses and stock
of every description; and it appears that their policy is in
conformity to the language which has often been attributed
to them, and that they do not destroy the Mexicans, because
they prefer that they should continue to raise stock for them
to drive· off. 'Until these Indians are effectually subdued
they will continue to blight the prosperity of that portion
of this Territory which is exposed to their depredations."2
In these words· Charles Bent described a situation inherited
by the United States from Mexico under the terms of the
1. Governor Bent later modified this incorrect view about permanent villages.
The Indians had few cattle.
2. Charles Bent to James Buchanan, 10/15/46, Department of War, Adjutant
General's Office, Old Records Division, Letters Sent, New Mexico, V, 14. Subsequent
citations will be abbreviated to AGO, LS, or other appropriate document.
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treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, a situation that required two
decades to remedy.
Judging from the comphiint of Senor Don Jose Montejo
at Cobero near San Felipe, the governor did not exaggerate
in his description of these terrors of New Mexico. Finding
a willing listener in his visitor, Lieutenant Abert, he told
how the Navaho rolled in wealth at the expense of his poor
New Mexican neighbors: "son muy ricos, tienen muchos
caballos, muchos carneras, muchos bucyos, muchos! muchos!
muchos !"3 And they not only raided the Rio Grande valley
to acquire wealth, but they also annoyed their neighbors to
the south and west, the Zulli and Moqui pueblos. The Utahs
to the north were too warlike to be interfered with very
much.
When the government prepared to conquer New Mexico
it recognized the fact that the chronic problem of the redman would be met with in the Southwest. General Kearny
marched with a supply of presents for the Indians and
arrived in New Mexico with "instructions from the government . . . to protect the persons and property of all quiet
and peaceable inhabitants within its boundaries against
their enemies, the Eutaws, the Navajoes, and others . ~ . "4
These instructions were acted upon. promptly. Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve Jackson was ordered to Cebolleta,
west of the Puerco, September 16, 1846, with three companies of troops to protect the frontier; he was also instructed to invite ten or twelve Navaho chiefs to Santa Fe
for a council, and to seize any stolen property chanced upon. 5
3. J. W. Abert, Report em New Mexico 181,6-71,. 30 C~ng., 1 sess., Sen. Ex. Doc.
23, p. 47 (506).
The inhabitants at the Old Placer mines grazed about 5,000 sheep in the neighboring valleys; "'Some years ago they raised many more, but the constant depredations
of the INavajoes' have caused a great diminution in their flocks." Ibid., p. 33.
"The Navajoes may be termed the lords of New Mexico. Few in number, disdaining
the cultivation of the soil, and even the rearing of cattle, they draw all their supplies
from the valley of the Del Norte." W.· H. Emory, Notes of a Military Reconnaissance
••• 181,6-1,7. 30 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Ex. Doc. 7, p. 47 (505).
4. Kearny Proclamation 8/22/46, 29 Cong., 2 sess., Hse. Ex. Doc. 19, p. 21 (499).
W. S. M. to Kearny 6/3/46, AGO, Military Book 26, p. 287.
5. AAAG (Acting Assistant Adjutant General) to Lieut.·Col. C. F. Ruff, 9/16/46,
cited in W. E. Connelley, Doniphan's Expedition . .. p. 250. Jackson succeeded Ruff
in command of the detachment. See also John T. Hughes, Doniphan'. Expedition, p. 84.
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Contact with the Navaho from Cebolleta was not very
satisfactory, so that on October 20th Captain Reid was
dispatched with thirty men on a venturesome trip into the
heart of their country, guided by the friendly Sandoval,
chief of a small band living near the post.
After several days travel the Reid party met "about
thirty warriors and eight or ten squaws; dressed in splendid
Indian attire, having fine figured blankets and panther-skin
caps, plumed with eagle feathers ... "6 Then pushing onward, they finally met another party under Chief Narbonna,
a man about 70 years old and suffering with rheumatism.
The conference that followed was almost disrupted by the
chief's wife, who apparently did not follow the ancient
tradition that a woman should be seen but not heard. She
argued strongly against negotiating with the visitors,
suspecting that they were laying plans for future treachery.
Narbonna remained master in his own household, however,
and after ordering the forcible removal of his wife, he
continued the discussions. The upshot of the conference
was a promise on the part of the Navaho present to meet
with the soldiers again at Agua Fria, forty miles from
Jackson's camp, and then proceed to Santa Fe to make a
treaty of peace with all their enemies. 7
But the failure of Navaho representatives to appear in
Santa Fe long before this meeting, and the sporadic depredations along the Rio Grande, led Kearny on October 2 to
order Colonel Doniphan into their country with instructions
to require the restoration of prisoners and stolen property,
and the giving of hostages for future good conduct. s Doniphan acted promptly and a two-fold military movement was
undertaken. Major Gilpin, stationed at Abiquiu, marched
by way of the San Juan river under orders to chastise the
6. J. S. Robinson, A Journal of the Santa Fe Expedition under Colonel Doniphan,
p.43.
7. Hughes, Don. Exp., p. 85. Connelley, Don. Exp., p. 295.
8. Kearny to AAAG, 10/2/46, cited in Hughes, Don. Exp., p. 75 . The Mexicans
and Pueblo Indians were also authorized to make war on the Navaho. Kearny to
Doniphan, 10/5/46, Kearny Papers, mss.
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hostiles, take hostages from the peaceful, and to meet Doniphan at Bear Springs. The commander-in-chief crossed the
Rio Grande at Albuquerque and joined Jackson at Covero,
near Cebolleta, on November 5. Without trouble, except for
the hardships of the country and climate, the two forces
finally met at Bear Springs on the 21st and held a council
with the Navaho who had assembled to talk with these
presumptuous claimants to their country.
Doniphan informed the Indians that the United States
claimed the country by right of conquest, and that both the
New Mexicans and the Navaho were our children; they
must decide whether to live at war or peace, and if a treaty
of peace was made, they must observe it-the United States
made no second treaty! In reply to these strong words,
"One of their chiefs, Sarcilla Largo, a young man very bold
and intellectual, spoke for them: 'He was gratified to learn
the views of the Americans. He admired their spirit and
enterprise, but detested the Mexicans.'''9 Since the Americans were at war with Mexico, he could not understand their
objection to the Navaho warring upon the same people.
The difference in point of view, however, did not prevent the signing of the first of a series of treaties between
the Navaho and the future owners of New Mexico. According to the terms of this Doniphan treaty of November 22,
there was to be peace between the two peoples; the American
people also meant the Mexicans and Pueblo Indians; there
was to be freedom of trade and mutual restoration of prisoners by exchange or purchase; and all property taken
since August 18, 1846, was to be restored by both sides. 10
The agreement was signed by fourteen Navaho, but the
ink was not dry before the document was meaningless.
During the fall of 1846 the depredations of the Navaho
continued. They even stole part of Doniphan's supply of
sheep near Socorro ashe was en route to Mexico. A theft
. of sheep usually brought a party of ~ueblo Indians, or
9. Hughes, Don. Exp., p. 95.
10. Ibid., p. 96.
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Mexicans, or American soldiers in pursuit; sometimes the
marauders were punished and the property recovered, other
times the victims had to endure their loss. A few lives were
lost on both sides, and scalp dances were held at the pueblos
of Laguna and Isleta. The Navaho, of course, did not seek
fights, but when hard pressed they were courageous enough
as Abert perhaps too vividly testifies in writing about one
clash south of Socorro in November when "With horrid
cries and shouts of 'Navahoe, Navahoe,' the Indians sprang
forward to the combat; they were dressed for war, being
ornamented with paints and plumes, and mounted on good
horses, and armed with bows and arrows, and lances...."11
These conflicts certainly furnished ground for Governor
Bent's gloomy feeling about the Doniphan freaty: "I have
but little ground to hope that it will be permanent."12 But
such pessimism could not be reflected by the government at
Washington because the acquisition of New Mexico was a
definite part of Polk's expansion program. Consequently,
in his address to Congress in December, 1847, the President
sounded a more optimistic note when he wrote: "If New
Mexico were held and 'governed by the United States, we
could effectually prevent these tribes from committing such
outrages, and compel them to release these captives, and
restore them to their families and friends."
In accomplishing the task confidently predicted by the
President, the military were not to be the sole agents.
Promptly on appointment as governor of New Mexico in
September, 1846, which carried the additional responsibility
of ex-officio superintendent of Indian Affairs, Bent discussed
extensively the problem in his earliest report to Washington
and recommended an Indian agent and three sub-agents for
New Mexico, and the establishment of "stockade Forts in
11. Report, 30 Cong.,
and Robinson, passim.
12. Bent to Buchanan,

1 sess.,

Sen. Ex. Doc.

12/26/46,

AGO, LS, V,

23,
42.

p.

82 (506)
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the Yuta and Nabajo countries with sufficient troops to keep
these [Indians] in check...."13
The recommendations were not acted upon until 1849
when the first steps were taken to carry them out. A new
Indian agency could only be created by Congress, but the
existing agencies could be moved about; consequently, due
to the comparatively tranquil state of affairs at the Council
Bluff agency, and in keeping with the recommendations of
Commissioner Medill, it was reduced to a sub-agency and a
full agency was established at Santa Fe by order of Secretary Ewing, March 29, 1849. 14 A commission as the first
agent in New Mexico was sent to James S. Calhoun on April
7th with the advice, "So little is known here of the condition
and situation of the Indians in that region that no specific
instructions, relative to them can be given at present.... "15
Meanwhile events were leading up to a second major
attempt to establish peace with the Navaho. Their forays
were a constant source of irritation and loss to the people
in the Rio Grande valley. And much to the annoyance of
the soldiers the Indians would seldom fight. When the
pursuit became too hot they abandoned the Gaptured flock
and vanished into the retreats of their country. But, like
the weather, the prospect of peace was always a ready topic
of conversation. In January, 1849, Chief Sandoval rePorted
to Captain Ker atCebolleta that his kinsmen wanted peace.
The Captain replied that he would make a treaty for that
purpose only with those Indians who would settle near his
military post, separate themselves from the others, and act
as informers. If they did not accept these terms to migrate
into his neighborhood and turn traitors he would chastise
. 13. Bent to Medill, 11/10/46, A. H. Abel, The Official Correspondence of James
S. Calhoun, p. 6f. Subsequent citations will be abbreviated to Abel. Bent to Buchanan,
9/24/46, AGO, LS, V, 2.
14. Medill to Ewing, 3/28/49, War Department, Indian Division, 1849-1851.
Ewing to Medill, 3/29/49, Abel, p. 2.
15. Medill to Calhoun, 4/7/49, Department of the Interior, Office of Indian
Affairs, Letterbook 42, p. 17. Subsequent citations will be abbreviated to OIA, LB, or
other appropriate document.
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them as soon as possible. 16 The captain's threat was as futile
as previous warnings of dire punishment. A week later
some Navaho ran off a flock of 6,000-8,000 sheep on the Rio
Puerco,17
When Calhoun arrived he readily accepted the current
view that the Navaho "are not to be subjected to just
restraints until they are properly chastised." Of course,
having been properly subdued, they were to be treated with
a liberal philanthropy until able to earn a living by work. 18
The chastisement, or at least the negotiation of a treaty at
the point of a gun was undertaken by Lieutenant-Colonel
WashLington and Calhounhin Augudst: h
f
f
eaving Jemez on t e 22n WIt a orce 0 348 men,
Washington met a party of Navaho in the Tunicha valley,
on the 30th. Upon his demand for the return of a stolen
horse, the restless Indians started to leave; the guard
stationed near Washington opened fire, killing Chief Narbonna and several other Indians.
Pushing on, the expedition entered the mouth of the
Canyon de Chelly, the garden spot of the Navaho country.
Here, on September 7,' new representatives appeared and
terms of a treaty were again presented. Mariano Martinez
was accepted as the head chief of the Navaho and Chapitone
as the second in command.. Four Mexican captives were
delivered up as a sign of good intentions, and on the 9th
the treaty terms were agreed upon, as follows:
In keeping with the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo the
Navaho were now under the jurisdiction of the United
States; they were to live in perpetual peace and friendship;
aggressions against the Indians should be referred to the
government for adjustment; the Navaho country was now
a part of New Mexico, subject to the Indian intercourse
16. Croghan Ker to AAAG, 1/29/49, AGO, New Mexico, Letters Received 1848-49,
Kl. Subsequent citations will read AGO, LR, followed by the document number and
year, as Kl/48-49;
17. Lieut. 0. H. R. Taylor to AAAG 2/7/49, AGO, LR, T3/48-49. Taylor to
AAAG, 2/28/49, Ibid., T4.
18. Calhoun to Medill, 7/29/49, Abel, p. 19.
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laws; the Navaho should deliver up the murderer or murderers of Micenti Garcia; they should surrender a~ Jemez by
October 9 all captives and stolen property; they should
enjoy the same protection in life and property as citizens
of the United States; the government would establish military posts and authorize trading houses; the government
should designate their territorial boundaries and pass necessary laws for their prosperity and happiness; and· the government would give donations, presents, and implements
deemed proper,19
The paper relationship between the Navaho and the
government was advanced considerably by this treaty. From
a people politically independent in fact, although under the
claimed jurisdiction of Mexico, they were now a "domesticdependent nation" subject to American law and jurisdiction; their new status was to be made clear by the establishment of military posts in their country, by limitations on
their freedom of movement, and by positive measures for
their welfare in the future.
But the actual relationship between the two groups
was not changed for a long while yet. September had barely
passed when Calhoun wrote that few people were bold
enough to travel alone ten miles from Santa Fe. He believed
that "The Navajoes commit their wrongs from a pure love
of rapine and plunder."20 And he had a concrete suggestion
for a remedy. Just give him four companies of Dragoons
with some Pueblo Indians, "and my life for it, in less than
six months I will so tame the Navajoes and Utahs that you
will scarcely hear of them again."21
The Indian agent was rather boastful, but conditions
were bad and force was an obvious necessity. Whether from
"pure love of rapine" or force of habit the Navaho during
19. Washington to AG, 9/25/49, 31 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Ex. Doc. I, p. 111 (549).
Calhoun to Mcdill, 10/1/49, Ahel, p. 26f. The treaty can be found in Abel, p. 21.
Brevet Lieut.-Col. J. M. Washington had assumed the duties of governor of New
Mexico October 11, 1848.
20. Calhoun to Medill, 10/1/49, Abel, p. 31.
21. Calhoun to Mcdill, 10/29/49, Abel, p. 65.
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the next year and a half committed an average of at least
one theft or killing a month in the Rio Grande valley or
among the western Pueblos. The remedy pretty well agreed
upon by the responsible leaders in New Mexico was voiced
by the territorial convention of 1849 in their instructions
to the delegate-elect to Congress, Hugh N. Smith, "That he
shall urge the establishment of a fort in the heart of the
Navijo country, to protect the people against the incursions
and robberies of this formidable and marauding Indian
tribe."22
The military commander did take some ineffective steps
to end the depredations. In the fall of 1849 a detachment
of troops was stationed at San Isidro in the Jemez valley, a
favorite haunt of the Navaho for trade or maraudirig, and
a second post was located at Cebolleta, where the road leading west from Albuquerque passed by and the friendly
Navaho under Sandoval lived. The Cebolleta site was
severely criticized by M. S. Howe, who assumed command
in May 9, 1850, but in the light of inadequate knowledge
of the Indian country it was not a bad selection at the
time. 23 But despite these measures complaints continued to
reach Washington to the effect "that our Indian troubles
are daily increasing, and our efficiency as rapidly decreasing."24
. During the spring and summer of 1850 an occasional
military expedition was launched against the marauders.
A Navaho attack on Zuni Pueblo in January brought Cap22. 31 Cong., 1 sess., Hse. Ex. Doc. 17, p. 102 (573).
23. Howe scorned the original idea that the post would guard a certain pass
through the mountains nearby by the claim that the Navaho ignored passes in their
forays, and that the pass was easily avoided anyway; AGO, LR, HI5/50.
The neighborhood was apparently deficient in forage for the cavalry horses also,
a common problem for. the military in those days. Capt. W. H. Saunders to AAAG,
12/4/50, Ibid., S31.
24. Calhoun to Brown, 1/25/50, Abel, p. 103.
"We say to you Sir with all due solemnity, our Indian troubles at this moment
are of a more terrible, and alarming character, than we have ever known them before.

and many of us have lived in .this territory from five to fifty years;" expiore the
country, establish military posts, and fix territorial limits for the Indians. M~morial
to the ~resident of the United States, Santa Fe, 2/27/50, Abel, p. 157.
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tain Ker from Cebolleta in pursuit. He was in the field for
fourteen days and had one "brush" with the Indians, otherwise the enterprise had no results and the Navaho remained
in the enjoyment of the two women and stock they had
'stolen. 25 In June the Navaho stole 15,000 sheep on the
Puerco. After they had ceased to worry about pursuit,
Lieutenant John Buford, now in command at Cebolleta, was
authorized to attack a party suspected of the depredation. 26
The results of the expedition are not at hand, but they were
certainly not decisive. The successor of Buford, Brevet
Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler, was drawn westward in October to aid the Zuni again. This time the Pueblo warriors
were loaned the use of sixty flint lock muskets with ammunition. They had asked for arms a year before, and alsq for
"permission to make a wa1', of extermination, against the
Navajoes;" an impossible task for 'them even if permission
were granted. 27 Meanwhile, the commander at San Isidro
had ·forbidden all traffic with the Navaho in the Jemez
valley and maintained a fixed policy of hostility toward them.
Until that decision was made the Indians had visited his
post frequently and had manifested signs of a friendly
attitude. 28
The matter of trade 'with the Navaho and also the
Apache was a source of concern to the government officials.
Governor Munroe had been unwilling to extend the intercourse laws to New Mexico by virtue of his 'military power,
but the significance of the trade to the operations of the army
led him in June, 1850, to regret that he "did not bring the subj~ct to the' particular notice of the Secretary of War at an
earlier period," and to make the following recommenda,.
tions: extend the Indian laws to New Mexico with suitable
modifications; provide penalties for violation of the 11th
25. Ker to AAAG, 1/22/50, AGO, LR, K1/50.
26. Buford to AAAG, 7/18/50, AGO, LR, B20/50. AAAG to Buford, 7/21/50,
AGO, LS, VI, 129.
27. Calhoun to Medill, 10/15/49, Abel" P. 50. AAAG to Chandler, 10/9/50, AGO,
LS, VI, 186.
'
28. Captain W. H. Gordon to AAAG, 5/27/50, AGO, LR, G18/50.
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article of the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo; and make the
military commander superior to the Indian department in
regard to both of those propositions because he believed
there would be too many Indian service officials engaged in
enforcing the law to make efficiency possible. 29
The significance of the trade to military operations was
probably in the sale of arms and ammunition to the Indians.
The granting of licenses was suspended in November, 1849,
but despite this the business was continued. In June, 1850,
Buford at Cebolleta reported that "Parties are frequently
passing near here with goods powder and lead for the
Apaches & Navajoes." He requested instructions about the
matter and was no doubt advised to break up the traffic.
Later in the month he stopped a party of fifty-two traders
twenty-seven miles southwest of Acoma carrying ammunition for Indians and with no license. Juan Padilla of
Atrisco was their leader and had dealt sharply with his
followers. He had claimed to be the possessor of a permit to
trade and had sublet his right for $2 per trader. Three of
the party were required to post $1,000 bonds for appearance
in court, but the outcome apparently was only the confiscation of the contraband goods. 30
The year 1851 was notable for major developments in
the policy of managing the Navaho, but marred by poor coordination of effort among the several public agencies.
Calhoun, having assumed the additional responsibilities of
territorial governor on March 3, lent official encouragement
to the old time practice of volunteer punitive (and plundering) expeditions against the Indians. On the 18th he issued
a proclamation encouraging such activities, stipulating that
all property taken was to be disposed of according to law and
that no depredations should be committed against the peaceful citizens. The next day the Pueblos were authorized to
undertake the same project, all property taken to be
29. John Munroe to AG, 6/11/50, Abel, p. 108. Calhoun to Brown, 11/15/49,
Abel, p. 77.
30. AGO, LR, 815/50; BI2/50; B9/50. AGO, L8, VI, 109-21. Abel, p. 105.

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NAVAHO

r

93

divided according to their laws and customs. He also attempted to secure government arms for the Jemez Pueblo
for protection against the Navaho, but Munroe was not so
sure about the exact relations that existed between those two
peoples and refused to grant the governor's reqllest. 31
But the efforts of the inhabitants themselves to subdue
the Navaho were like wearing away stone with drops of
water. Despite the decades that the Rio Grande valley had
been settled, the people apparently had never equipped themselves with adequate means of self-defense. They no doubt
had the man.:power, and as Calhoun explained, "If we had
the use of one thousand stand of arms at this time, we could
effectually check depredations that are being daily committed in our very midst." 32 So, without adequate means of
defense at his command and lacking instructions from Washington, the governor could do little more than pour out his
lament to the commissioner: "My condition is a more unsatisfactory one, at this time, than at any former period since
I have been in the Territory. I am without the slightest
advice as to the purposes of the Government in reference to
the Indians in this Territory, and I know nothing of the
means, provided by Congress, for their management ... I am
daily assuming responsibilities that will bring me into discredit, if not sustained by the Department. 33
However much the gloom of the governor was justified,
his energetic actions toward encouraging war against the
Navaho may have had the effect of lifting the veil that hid
the real conditions existing among that nation. Apparently
they were not all desirous of committing acts that the white
31. Abel, pp. 300-301. Munroe to Calhoun, 3/31/51, AGO, LS, VII, 68.
A volunteer expedition in the winter returned with 5,000 sheep, other stock, 52
prisoners, and the loss of a few of their own lives. Abel, p. 285.
Manuel Chaves proposed to raise 600 volunteers, 3/18/51: "the only recompense
they ask for their services, is to have the disposal of the interests of the country they
are to conquer, such as the disposal of captives, animals cattle etc. and they on their
part promise to pursue the Navajo Nation to their extermination or complete Burrender." Abel, p, 302.
32. Calhoun to Fillmore, 3/29/51, Abel, p. 305.
33. Calhoun'to Lea, 4/29/51, Abel, p. 337.
Congress had taken action, but the governor had not yet been informed of it.

94

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

man called robbing; some of them had sufficient means of
their own by this time to favor peace with other men. As
early as the fall of 1849 Calhoun had suspected that they
were divided into a warlike party and a peace party, or what
officials later termed the ladrones and ricos,. "but," as he
said, "who can avouch the fact?" 34 Now reports from the
Navaho country indicated that the Indians had divided into
two general groups; one group was on the upper San Juan
river fraternizing with the Utahs and desirous of peace with
the whites; the other group was located on the lower San
Juan and the Canyon de Chelly and had more internal differences over the proper course to pursue. 35
On two different occasions in April and May, representatives of the Navaho appeared at Cebolleta and expressed a
desire for peace.36 These overtures were rejected both by
Munroe and Calhoun on the ground that the Washington
treaty of 1849 was binding and that no new treaty would be
negotiated nor conference held until the terms of that document had been complied withP However, a few families
who desired to be friendly were granted permission to locate
with the Sandoval band near Cebolleta. 38 The sheep could
separate from the goats if such were possible.
Regardless of the possibility of a peace group among
the Navaho, the depredations continued. A particularly
bold attack on Isleta in the heart of the Rio Abajo on June 25
led th~ territorial legislature to send a strong memorial to
President Fillmore. They requested arms for volunteers;
they requested the delegation of power to the governor to
call out the militia; and they condemned the utter inefficiency of the soldiers: they were brave but resting on their
laurels 13 9 Rumors of trouble near Cebolleta led to the
34. Abel, p. 77. See also pp. 44, 49, 290.
35. AGO, LR, G5, G10, C37, C55/51. AGO, LS, VII, 93.
36. AGO, LR, 4/19/51, and 5/6/51, C43/51.
37. AAAG to Chandler, 4/25/51, AGO, LS, VII, 102.
38. AAAG to Chandler, 6/10/51, AGO, LS, VII, 168.
39. Abel, pp. 364, 367. Ten more traders with ammunition for the Navaho, and
no license, were arrested near Abiquiu in July. AGO, LR, G13/51.
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strengthening of the garrison at Albuquerque. This precaution was justified because on July 12 or 13 a party, probably
hay contractors, were attacked near Ojo de Gallinas (or
Gallo), with the loss of two men killed, eight wounded, and
three missing. Additional troops were rushed to the post
at Cebolleta from Albuquerque. 4o
Meanwhile, the efforts of the territorial volunteers and
the soldiers to control the Indians were being seconded in
Washington in both the military and civil departments. The
Washington treaty had been ratified by the Senate in September, 1850, and the following February the laws relating
. to intercourse with Indians were extended to New Mexico
and four agents were provided to assist the superintendent
in managing the several tribes in the Territory.41 In August
of 1851 the sum of $18,000 was made available by Congress
for carrying out the charitable provisions of the treaty.42
On the military side of Indian management, .the groundwork had been laid for a more adequate system of frontier·
defense. Inspector General George A. McCall made a trip
to the Territory in the summer of 1850 and among other
recommendations proposed the location of a fort near the
Canyon de Chelly.43 This report was reflected in the appointment of Colonel E. V. Sumner as commander of the department, March 29, 1851, with instructions to revise the
frontier defenses for the better protection of the settlements,
remove the soldiers from the demoralizing influence of town
life, and to make a campaign against the Navaho. The department of war had been "induced to believe, that no permanent peace can exist with the Indians, and no treaty will
40. AGO. LR. 061 and 062/51; AGO. LS. VII. 181. 210. .
41. United States Statutes at Large. IX. 587. Hereafter abbreviated to USSL.
If the treaties are ratified, Hand the requisite niilitary force, and the necessary
agents. are provided to compel those two tribes [Navaho and Utah] to observe their
stipulations in good faith. I presume that so far as they are concerned. but little
further will be required."
But Indian relations must "depend mainly upon the
military" .•. by a "system of control by fear." Orlando Brown to Calhoun. 4/24/50.
OIA. LB43. p. 153.
42. USSL, IX. 572. Mix to Calhoun. 8/8/51. OIA. LS 45. p. ·50.
43. See A. B. Bender, HFrontier Defense in the Territory of New Mexico."
NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW. IX. 262 (1934).
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be regarded by them until they have been made to feel the
power of our arms."44
The new commander assumed charge of the department
on July 19 and established general headquarters at Fort
Union. Within a month he was leaving Santo Domingo for
the Navaho country. His troops killed and wounded a few
Indians hovering along the line 'of march near Canyon
Bonito, penetrated the Canyon de Chelly a distance of eleven
miles, and on September 18 selected the site for Fort Defiance at Canyon Bonito. "If this post does not put a stop
to the ,Navajo depredations," he wrote, "nothing will do it
but their entire extermination.~'45 Neither statement was
realized in fact.
While Sumner was in the Navaho country the Indians
were "traveling in every direction through this Territory,
committing murders and depredations. . . . On the 8th of
this month' [September] ... [they] committed depredations
within seven miles and a half of this city [Santa Fe] ."46
Furthermore, the newly appointed agent for the Navaho,
Major E.H. Wingfield, had been unable to contact his charges
because Sumner had "declined affording the 'facilities' which
his instructions authorized."47 Sumner felt a "want of authority" in declining to take Wingfield with him. Since
Calhoun had "no authority to call out the militia," he concurred in the agent's determination to proceed to Washington in order to enlighten the commissioner on the true state
of affairs in New Mexico. 48 But unfortunately for the agent,
his personal appearance without their authorization was not'
pleasing to the Washington authorities and he lost his job.
44. C. M.Conrad to. Sumner, 4/1/51, Abel, p. 383. AG to Sumner, 3/29/51,
AGO', LR, A13/51. Secretary of War, Annual Rep<Yrt, 1851, 32 Cong., 1 sess., Sen.
Ex. Doc. '1, p. 106 (611).
4,5. Sumner to Jones, 10/24/51, Abel, p. 417.
46. Calhoun to Major E. H. Wingfield, 9/17/51, Abel, p. 426.
47. Calhoun to Lea, 8/22/51, Abel, p. 401.
Sumner had been instructed
act in "concert" with the superintendent.
Wingfield's commission had been sent to him 3/24/51.
48. Calhoun to Wingfield, 9/17/51, Abel, p. 426.
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Meanwhile Calhoun was determined to do something
to remedy the situation. Lacking money, munitions, or
power to call out the militia; with an agent unable to contact
the Indians and a military commander who did not cooperate
according to his notion, "do you not perceive, I must be
sadly embarrassed and disquieted ?"49 And, if his efforts
failed, he wrote to Daniel Webster, the people would be
forced· to take care of themselves or· "be plundered and
butchered."50
The "something" that Calhoun undertook to do was the
resumption of his policy of the spring of 1851 when he authorized volunteer expeditions against the Navaho. N9w,
however, his decision led to a dispute with the military over
the advisability of such operations. When some citizens of
Santa Fe requested arms for offensive operations, Sumner
agreed to furnish seventy-five flint lock muskets and ammunition but stipulated that they should be used for defensive
action only. He also intimated that force would be used to
prevent offensive action, or "predatory" war as he called it,
on the ground that it was contrary to War Department
orders, interference with his duties, and that it would prove
an obstacle to the eventual pacification of the Navaho which
he hoped for now with the establishment of Fort Defiance.
Calhoun, on the other hand, charged that the troops in the
Territory were insufficient in numbers, their horses were in
too poor condition for active operations, and that under such
conditions the inhabitants were entitled to protect themselves. The crux of the matter then was whether or not the
armed territorials should act oli the offensive or defensive
against the Navaho. The exchange of correspondence between the governor and commander became rather heated,
but Sumner finally relented about using force to prevent
offensive action and laid the whole· matter before the war
department for further instructions. 51
49. Calhoun to Luke Lea, 8/31/51,
50. 10/29/51, Abel, p. 440.
51. Abel, pp. 445-447, 449, 455.

Abel, p.

414.
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Although several measures had been taken to solve the
Navaho problem, the reports from New Mexico presented a
gloomy picture to official circles in Washington:
The apparently slow.progress which has been
made in the work of establishing friendly relations
with such Indians of the Territory as have been for
years plundering and murdering the inhabitants
without fear or restraint, may be justly attributed
to a combination of circumstances over which the
officers of this department have had no control. The
country itself, wild, desert and mountainous; the
savage nature and untamed habits of most of the
Indians who roam over it; the lawlessness of many
of its other inhabitants, often more reckless than
the Indians themselves; the scattered, mixed, and
heterogeneous character of its population in general-all tend to produce a state of things so discreditable and deplorable, as to render its acquisition a misfortune, and· its possession a reproach to
the government. To remedy these evils, liberal
appropriations of money, and a more vigorous and
untrammelled exercise of authority by the civil
officers of the Territory, are indispensable. 52
However, the gloomy outlook in the fall of 1851 was
shortly to give way to a more cheerful state of affairs. The
policy of military coercion was to be replaced by the giving
of presents to preserve the peace. The change was foreshadowed not only in the report of the commissioner just
quoted, but also in the report of the secretary of war:
... policy and humanity both require that we should
employ some other means of putting a stop to these
depredations than the terror of our arms; we
should try the effect of conciliatory measures. 53
52. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1851, 32 Cong., 1 sess., Hse.
Ex. Doc. 2, p. 271 (636).
53. Annual Report, 1851, 32 Cong., 1 sess., Sen. Ex. Doc. 1, p. 113 (611).
This conciliatory policy apparently originated in Washington. Calhoun had been
in favor of aggressive measures against the Navaho, and Sumner did not favor the
change at first.
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The first step was taken when Calhoun and Sumner met
about two hundred Navaho at Jemez on December 25.. The
Indians promised to keep quiet, to restore all Mexican captives, and gave three hostages as a token of good faith.
Calhoun, in h,lrn, gave them about $2,000 or $3,000 worth of
presents, much to the displeasure of Sumner. The commander believed that a rod of iron was still the best policy;
the presentation of gifts, he thought, would lead the Navaho
into the erroneous idea that their submission had been purchased, and that such an idea would jeopardize the benefits
resulting from the establishment of Fort Defiance. 54 And
the location of that post in the heart of their country, in addition to the killing of a few Navaho, probably did have a restrailling effect on the Indians; at least there were no depredations reported from October 18 to the time of the conference at Jemez. 55
In keeping with this agreement, a number of Navaho
returned to Jemez, January 27, 1852, and surrendered three
captive Mexican boys. Their spokesman, Armijo, also
expressed a desire for the continuation of peace. When
Greiner stated that the Mexicans were resentful at the stealing of children and flocks of sheep by the Indians, the chief
warmly replied that "My people are all crying in the same
way. ..." Eleven times, he claimed, they had surrendered
captives and the Mexicans only once, that they had lost more
children than their enemies, and that any arrangement made
by the agent for preventing such practices would be acceptable to them. 56
54. Sumner to Jones, 1/1/52, Abel, p. 433. Sumner to Jones, 1/27/52, AGO.
LS, VIII, 124.
55. Calhoun to Lea, 2/29/52, Abel, p. 488.
Major E. Backus, commander at Fort Defiance, mentions a treaty with the
Navaho on October 26. Backus to AAAG, 1/4/52, AGO. LR, B2/52. Backus to
Kendrick, 3/10/52, K12/54. This may have been an informal understanding between
the post commander and some Navaho.
56. Greiner to Calhoun, 1/31/52, Abel, P. 466.
A commission as agent was sent to John Greiner March 25, 1851.
Both Greiner and Calhoun agreed that the Navaho were justified in their com-
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The period of peace lasted until the summer of 1853,
with only one or two incidents to mar the good relations
between the two peoples. The policy of placating the Indians with gifts was continued by Governor Lane and the
reports from all sources for several months were uniformly
optimistic. Even Sumner relaxed a bit from his attitude of
sternness:
I am convinced that the only way to subdue
Indians effectually and permanently, is to improve
their condition, and the best way to do this, is to
establish posts in the heart of their country, where
we can bring them about uS,and instruct them in
agriculture and other useful arts.
And he hoped that the propensity of the young men to steal
as proof of their valor would soon disappear. 57 Some seeds
were distributed to the Navaho in the spring of 1852 and
they farmed their lands quietly and perhaps more extensively
than usual. "I think this tribe is effectually subdued," Sumner wrote, "and in the best possible way, by improving their
condition."58
However effective aid in farming was, the officials did
not relax in their attitude toward the importance of presents
for the Indians. When some confusion concerning the funds
of the superilltendency arose with the departure of Calhoun
from New Mexico in May, 1852, Sumner did not hesitate to
tide over the difficulty by drawing on ,his own financial re57. Sumner to Conrad, 3/27/52, AGO, LS, VIII, 186.
Lane spent $19,174.51 from January to August, 1853, nearly the entire appropriation for the year ending 6/30/53. Manypenny to McClelland, 2/2/54, OIA, War
Department letters, 1852-1854.
58. Sumner to Jones, 3/22/52, AGO, LS, VIII, 181.
plaint. Such. practices of course long antedated the American occupation of New
Mexico.
"I have seen frequently little children from eighteen months to six years old, led
around the country like beasts, by a Mexican who had probably stolen them from their
mother not more than a week, and offered for Bale for from forty to one hundred and
twenty dollars:' Anonymous article dated Albuquerque, 7/23/52, printed in Santa

. Fe Weekly Gazette, 11/20/52.
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sources. 59 When the suppiy of tobacco ran low at Fort 'Defiance, the commander commented along with his request for
more that "The policy adopted by Maj. Backus has operated
most happily in preserving the best relations with the Navajos and I am confident that if the Commanding officer here
has the means of Continuing to make this station necessary
to them as a place of profit, barter or trade, no difference
with them need ever occur. They are now in the habit of
bringing back to this post every animal that strays from
it;"60
T~e civil officials were equally pleased with the situation. Agent Baird met a group of about 1,500 Navaho in
November, 1852, and he did "not think there are the slightest of apprehension of an outbreak, on the part of these
Indians."61 After a tour of the Navaho country in March,
1853, he was happy to inform the commissioner at Washington "that the prospect of civilization grows more [promising] with my tribe (Navajoes). A small annual appropriation as you have been advised is all that is necessary to
this tribe in a state of dependence:"62
But suddenly a small annual appropriation did not seem
sufficient to continue the peaceful relations. There were still
trouble-makers among the Navaho and they made themselves known again. In March of 1853 they stole a small
flock of sheep near Pefia Blanca. On May 3 a certain Ramon
59.
5/9/52,
60.
61.

Sumner to Calhoun, 5/20/52, AGO, LS, VIII, 267. Sumner to Backus,
Ibid., 247.
Captain J. H. Eatin to AAAG, 8/7/52, AGO, LR, E20/52.
Baird to Lane, 11:/27/52, OIA, New Mexico Superintendency, Outgoing
Letters, vol. 1. Hereafter cited as OIA, NMS, OL.
Governor William Carr Lane assumed his duties as governor and superintendent,
September 10, 1852. AGO, LS, VIII, 370.
S. M. Baird was appointed special agent at Jemez by Calhoun February 1, 1852,
to prevent tampering with the Navaho bY,evil disposed people. His commission as
agent was sent from Washington January 31, 1852. Abel, p. 488; OIA, LB 45, p. 412.
62. Baird to Lea, 4/12/53, OIA, LR, B234/53.
There was one Bour opinion in this period of peace. When the secretary of war
in his annual report of 1852 stated that "The Navajos . . . have been completely
overawed, and manifest every desire to be at peace with the whites," the Santa Fe
Weekly Gazette, 2/26/53, considered it novel news; "It cannot be asserted that the
peace has been 'conquered;' but it may be asserted, perhaps with entire truth, that
it has been bought."
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Martin and young son were killed near Vallecito, two boys
captured, and some stock stolen; in the same month a large
flock of sheep belonging to A. Garcia was taken near Ojo de
Gallinas. These incidents were important in bringing out
various aspects of the problem involved in the relation
between the Navaho and the government.
The officials believed in the old saying of an iron hand
in a velvet glove, but were reluctant to actually use the hand.
John Greiner, now secretary of the Territory, instructed
Agent Baird to "Give the Navajoes to understand these
sheep must be accounted for at once,"63 referring to the theft
at Peiia Blanca. The case of Martin aroused Governor Lane
to a fever pitch of indignation. He appointed two special
agents to investigate the killing (and the theft of sheep at
Peiia Blanca) and offered heavy rewards for the capture of
the culprits, $200 for the leader and $100 for each of his
followers:

These very important objects, must be obtained, cost what it may, in time and labor, to the
Indian Agents and their servants; and what it may,
in money, to the U. S. The citizens must be protected, in their rights of property .. and human blood
must not be shed, and human liberty violated with
impunity. And Indian Agents must be at their respective posts, and energetic, in the discharge of
their duties."64
63. 3/19/53, OIA, NMS, OL, I, 182.
64. Lane to Steck, 5/6/53, Ibid., I, 176. Lane to Sumner, 5/25/53, Ibid., I, 231.
The reason for two special agents at this time was due to the failure of Agent
Baird to respond promptly to Lane's conception of the duties of an agent. Because
of the "utter inefficiency of the Indian Department" he had issued a circular requiring
agents to reside with their tribe or "as near thereto as practicable." 11/2/52, Ibid.,
I, 58.
"I have experienced much official embarrassment in this Ter.-which was not
anticipated. I was disappointed in the ';'easures of defense adopted by the commanding
off. of the Dept. The Indn Agt. disappointed my just expectation,-& hence the
necessity of the enclosed circular. And the Civil Depart. was chaotic." Lane to
Kendrick, 12/3/52, Ibid., I, 62.
For instructions to special agents see Ibid., I, 179, 184.
Baird was probably too immersed in business affairs at Albuquerque to contact
his charges more closely. Santa Pe Weekly Gazette, 5/14/53.
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The Navaho were given until July 1 to surrender the murderers or their country wOllld be invaded. Meanwhile the
governor had written to Sumner: "I respectfully suggest to
you the propriety, nay absolute necessity, of inflicting upon
the Pueblo, or Tribe, [in this case the Navaho] to which they
may belong, severe chastisement."65
The military commander fell in with Lane's plan of
punitive action, and finally set July 6 as· the deadline ·for the
restoration of the murderer, six days later than the governor's ultimatum. 66 In June Major Kendrick made a six day
tour of the Navaho country and met several groups of Indians. He warned them that unless satisfaction was given
war would be waged against them, "their flocks seized, their
men killed, their women and children taken captive, and.
ultimately the mountain made their eastern limit," They
professed their inability to surrender the murderer because
of fear of revenge and the fact that he had fled from his
home district, but they promised "to give him up or kill him
when they could" and to restore the sheep by the end of the
month. 67 Kendrick was convinced, however, that they would
not surrender him.
The Navaho did not want war and made restitution to
a certain extent. Most of Garcia's sheep were promptly
returned. Special Agent Vigil secured the return of the
captive boys without difficulty; and the Indians were willing
to pay for the murder of Martin and son. 68 But this was the
important issue and the government officials were now finding themselves in an uncomfortable situation.
Neither Lane nor Sumner wanted war any more than
did the Indians. They were motivated fundamentally by
the idea of making the Navaho conform to the whiteman's
law. A murder was a murder, whether committed by a
whiteman or redman, and the guilty should be punished,
65.
66.
67.
68.
K13/53.

5/10/53, Ibid., T, 188.
Sumner to Kendrick, 6/4/53, AGO, LS, vol. VIII.
Kendrick to AAAG, 6/14/53, AGO, LR, K15/53.
OIA, NMS, OL, T, 174, 241. OIA, LR, N120/53. AGO, LR, E12, K10, Kll,
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though perhaps exact due process of law need not be followed. Consequently, while they put strong pressure on the
Indians to surrender the culprit, they hoped for a peaceful
ending to the whole matter. Furthermore, if war came the
strategy to be followed was a moot point. The military favored indiscriminate crop destruction as a necessary corollary to fighting, whereas Lane favored drawing a distinction between the friendly and unfriendly Navaho, and the
avoidance .of crop destruction, which would necessitate'
further marauding on the part of the Indian to escape
. .
.
starvation. 69
As the month of June ran its course the two leaders
were troubled about being consistent toward the Indian, of
following the routine of punitive action sanctified by time or
modifying practice to fit the realities of the case. ."But for
myself," wrote Governor Lane, "I will look steadily at the
requirements of the law, of Justice & sound policy, & will
regulate my conduct accordingly, leaving the issue to him
in whose hands we all are."70 He repeated his futile instructions to Agent Baird to proceed to his post of duty in order
to facilitate a happy outcome: an agent "may yet avert war."
And when Agent Dodge was appointed to the position vacated by Baird, the Governor held to his course; war was
undesirable, but the murderer must be apprehended, and,
if necessary, Dodge could increase the reward for his apprehension to $400.71
Sumner, on the other hand, was beginning to weaken on
the proposition of deliver the murderer or war will result
due to the pacific behavior of the Navaho after the above
incidents, their obvious attempts to prevent trouble by returning the stolen property, and their point of view that the
69. Kendrick to AAAG, 5/25/53, AGO, LR, K13/53. Lane to Sumner, 6/12/53,
Ibid., N14/53. Sumner to Lane, 6/10/53, AGO, LS, VIII, 543/l'. Lane to Sumner,
6/18/53, orA, NMS, OL, I, 294.
70. Lane to'Sumner, 6/12/53, AGO, LR, N14/53.
71. Lane to Baird, 7/8/53, AGO, LR, N14/53. OIA, NMS, OL, I, 317.
The commission as Navaho agent was sent to Henry L. Dodge, 5/7/53. He was
killed by Apache Indians on November 19, 1856, while hunting thirty-five miles south
of Zuiii.
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return of the murderer was not a tribal responsibility, Qr if
it was, such a deed was impossible or fraught with even
greater evil for them. Consequently, he gradually came to
the opinion that war "would neither be justifiable nor politic" immediately. Furthermore, a change in the command
of the ninth military department was rumored and it might'
be best to leave the problem to his successor, General John
Garland. 72
'
The change of command proved to be more than a
rumor. General Garland arrived at headquarters in Albuquerque on August 8. Meanwhile Lieutenant-Colonel D. J.
Miles had taken over when Sumner left for the east and
adopted a conciliatory policy. He merely made display of
force by sending Kendrick on a reconnaissance of the
Navaho country in July, believing that a war would be long
and costly, and in the ultimate treaty "the points in contention which caused the war will be veiled by a concession
on our part." Of course the balance of the stolen sheep must
be returned, and the "murderers, if they can be found-and
they can catch them."73 An unlikely happening since they
were reported as living among the Utah Indians.
There was also a change in the civil administration, and
the new governor, David Meriwether, found upon his arrival
at Santa Fe in August that the delicate problem facing Lane
had faded away for the time being. But in planning for the
future he made certain recommendations to the commissioner. He accepted the principle "that the government
must either feed and clothe these Indians to a certain extent
or chastise them in a decisive manner." He proposed that
the Indian title to land near the settlements be extinguished
by treaty in order to remove the redman from contact with
the vices of the white man, that annuities be granted to the
Indians, and that any losses sustained from their depredations be deducted from the government appropriation. In

a

72. Sumner to Lane, 6/15/53, AGO, LS, VIII, 551, 553.
8/15/58, AGO, LR, KI9/58.
78. Miles to Kendrick, 7/3/53, AGO, LS, VIII, 555.

Kendrick to AAAG,
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this view he was no doubt influenced by Major Kendrick who
had observed that "those bands residing most remote from
and having the least intercourse with the whites are in a
much better condition than the others.
"Whilst he discribes the one party as being an abject
and degraded people who rarely labour for their support
he discribes the other as having the finest fields of corn and
wheat that grows in the Territory." And the ones nearer
the settlements, of course, were accused of being the troublemakers. 74
In September, Agent Dodge brought a delegation of
·100 Navaho, headed by SarciIIo Largo, to Santa Fe to talk
with the new governor. On this occasion Meriwether tried
to instill into their minds the conception of obedience to
authority. He presented a medal with ribbon to each of six
headmen and told them that they would be responsible for
their respective bands. Largo was appointed captain over
all the others and received more ribbon on his medal as a
sign of his superior position. 75 Then some presents were distributed and the Indians returned home, but 'Yith what
thoughts in their minds it is hard to say.
The need for delimitation of the Navaho country as recommended by Meriwether became a matter of increasing
concern to the officials in New Mexico. The immense area
of grazing country to the west was a natural attraction for
the sheep grower of the Rio Grande valley. The :region had
74. Meriwether to Manypenny, 8/31/53, OIA, LR, N153/53.
In the midst of the excitement in the spring, Lane had analyzed the situation:
"All the Indians of New Mexico, except the Pueblo Indians, are Tenants at Will, &
therefore under existing laws have no country of their own; and the White man is
constantly encroaching upon them; & this is one cause of perpetual strife & violence,
between the two races. To remedy this evil, Congress must, of necessity, meet the
difficulty by assigning to the Indians a portion of country, which shall be legally
their own, & upon which the White man cannot intrude." He suggested a north-south
line about the 108 or 109 meridian as boundary between the two groups. OIA, NMS,
OL, I, 208.
75. Meriwether to Manypenny, 9/19/53, OIA, LR, N177/53.
The governor was very favorably impressed with the personal appearance of the
Indians: "They are a fine healthy looking people remarkably well clothed in fabricks
of their own manufactury and appear to be the best red and clothed Indians west ·of
the Arkansas river."
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a history of thefts of flocks by the Navaho and attempts to
recover them by military or voluntary expeditions; but despite these losses and the occasional killing of a shepherd by
the Indians, the practice was continued of grazing sheep far
into the Navaho country. And, as Kendrick wrote, "it is to
be regretted that owners of flocks ... are placing an almost
irresistible temptation to robbery before a people under
whose exactions New Mexico has groaned for a third of a
century.76
Meriwether felt powerless to remedy this situation since
the United States District Court had decided that New Mexico was not a part of the Indian Country and the intercourse
laws did not apply.77 Consequently, he renewed his recommendation in September, 1854, that a reservation be established, a plan that received the endorsement of General
Garland: "if there is not some speedy action had upon this
subject trouble will ensue."78
In the midst of these reports to Washington, Congress
took action in July, 1854, by appropriating $30,000 to defray
the cost of making treaties with the Apache, Utah, and
Navaho, "by which permanent and well defined relations of
amity shall be established between· them and the United
States." In the spring of 1855 Meriwether was appointed
special commissioner to carry out the terms of the act. In
order to keep the Indian stock off the army grazing grounds
at Fort Defiance, and to allay any suspicion they might have
had at being requested to assemble so close to the fort, the
meeting was arranged at Laguna Negra, in July.79
76. 2/10/54, OIA, LR, N233/54.
"I kno,w not what explanation to make of such criminal recklessness, unless I am

furnished the key to it in the remark made to me bY one who seemed more anxious to
'protect his two or three mules than to recover his large flock of sheep, who had bee~
stolen-viz. (if I lose my sheep the government will pay for them." Ibid.

77. OIA, NMS, OL, I, 475.
78. Garland to AAG, 12/31/54; AGO, LB, IX, 261. Meriwether to Manypenny,
9/30/54, OIA, NMS, OL, II, 204. '
79. Manypenny to Meriwether, 3/16/55, OIA, LB 51, p. 89. Kendrick to Meriwether, 5/28/55; AGO, LR, Kll/55.
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The goverilpr followed very closely the instructions
received from Commissioner Manypenny in regard to the
terms of the treaty, and by the 18th the document was completed and signed. The provisions were as follows: "Peace,
friendship and amity shall forever hereafter exist. . . ;" the
Navaho agreed to remain at peace with all Indians, cede all
claim to territory except as reserved, to cultivate the soil,
and to remove to the reservation within twelve months. The
reservation boundary ran from the so:uth bank of the San
Juan at the mouth of the Rio de CheIly, up the San Juan to
the mouth of Canada del Amarillo, up the Amarillo to the
divide between the Colorado river and Rio Grande, along
the divide southwest to the head of the main branch of the
Zuni river, down the northside to the junction with the
Colorado Chiquito, thence north to the beginning point.
Lands belonging to the Zuni and Moqui pueblos were exempt,
and also fifty square miles around Fort Defiance.
The President was empowered to grant lands in severalty and to issue patents, with restriction on the rights of
alienation, when the individual Indian was considered competent for such responsibility. Other lands could be assigned
them in exchange for mineral areas that might be found on
the reservation. Necessary·. highways and railroads could
be established as thought necessary.. Inreturn, the Navaho
were to receive $10,000 in 1856 and 1857, $6,000 annually
from 1858 to 1860, and $4,000 annually from 1861 to 1876.
There were certain restrictions on the use of the annuities~ The president should decide how much was to be spent
.for education and moral improvement, how much for farming, and how much to be given in cash. They were not to be
.applied to the payment of individual debts or tribal debts,
but the president should decide what satisfaction was to be
made for depredations.
Finally, no liquor was allowed on the reservation, and
the Navaho agreed to assume responsibility for acts of indi-
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viduals. Any grievances on their part could be redressed by
appeal to the Indian agent. so
Negotiations for the treaty went off fairly smoothly on
the 16th and 17th. The first day some of the 1,500 Indians
present displayed a bit of hostility, but Chief Manuelito apol.
ogized for their conduct. Meriwether knew, as he expressed
it, that only the "boys" caused the trouble. One point of
difficulty was the surrendering of bad men for punishment
by the government. The governor insisted on this point
because a bad Indian could not be distinguished from a good
Indian when the military undertook an arrest. Incidentally
a new head chief was elected. . Sarcillo Largo resigned due
to advancing age and Manuelito was elected in his place.
Fourteen headmen signed the document; all, it was claimed,
except Sandoval, chief of the band living in the neighborhood ofCebolleta that was friendly toward the whites, but at
odds with their own people. s1
.
The treaty, on the whole, was favorable to the Navaho,
and marked a step forward in trying to carry out the happi:.
ness and prosperity clauses of .the Washington treaty of
1849..The granting of land in severalty was in the direction
of transforming the Indian into a responsible individual in
keeping with the organization of the white man's society;
in attaining this objective, education for his spiritual, moral,
and physical improvement was to be provided. Of course
the potential mineral wealth on the proposed reservation
was reserved for the white man, and lines of communication
to the westward were not overlooked. The eastern boundary
was approximately parallel to the Rio Grande about 110
miles to the west, or about fifty miles west of Cebolleta, the
westernmost settlement. Why a western boundary was
stipulated is not clear because the land beyond Canyon de
Chelly was little known. In general, the boundaries cut off
80. OIA, Unperfected Treaties. No. 274A.
81. "Talk" re signing treaty. ·OIA, ·LR. N486/55. Garland to AAG: 7/31/55;
AGO, LS, IX, 381. Dodge to Manypenny, 8/2/55, OIA, LR, N498/55 .. Meriwether to
Manypenny, 7/25/55, OIA, NMS, OL, II, 58 Off.
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a generous slice of grazing land for the whites and included
the known arable lands of the Indians.
Unfortunately, the treaty was not ratified by the Senate
after an unfavorable committee report. This action was
partly due to opposition in the Territory; the eastern boundary of the reservation was considered to. be too favorable
for the Indians because too much land was closed to white
settlement. 82 However, financial assistance had been provided for the improvement of the Navaho. The sum of
$5,000 was appropriated annually, beginning in 1854, and
expended for various and sundry purposes such as hoes,
axes, tobacco, vegetable seeds, brass wire, butcher knives,
Mexican sugar, and strings of coral. But such assistance
was not intended to create a tribe permanently dependent on
the government for support. The purpose was "assistance
to the Indians in locating themselves in permanent abodes,
and sustaining themselves by the pursuits of civilized life."83
While the dole system was being practiced and the
Meriwether treaty was running its course, the Navaho remained nominally at peace, with an occasional unhappy episode, much as had been the case before the crisis of 1853.
The first incident to mar the calm was the murder of a
soldier near Fort Defiance, probably early in October, 1854.
The problem and the policy to be followed were as usual,
and were clearly stated by Kendrick:
I believe this outrage to indicate no hostility
on the part of any Considerable number of Navajoes, but to be the act of a miscreant who is countenanced only by a few, who like himself are tired
of an unusually long peace, and are anxious for
excitement. Still, unless the amplest satisfaction
is coerced for this deed we may expect a repetition
of such things on a larger scale, & [coin?] as Great
or Greater ones elsewhere.
82. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, clipping in Miguel A. Otero to McClelland, 12/5/56,
OlA, LR, 014/56. Meriwether to Manypenny, 1/23/57, Ibid., N236/57. Legislative
Memorial to Congress, January, 1857, Ibid. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, 2/23/56.
83. Manypenny to Meriwether, 1/10/57, OlA, LB 56, p. 37.
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I am sending for the Chiefs to come in here, &
shall make a formal demand upon them for the
delivery of the Murderer, but I have no idea that it
will be yielded to in the first instance, for the Navajoes, however desirous a majority of them may be
of peace, either from a real or fancied inability to
do so, have never surrendered a guilty party,
always affirming that to be impossible. Certainly
there is no hope of their yielding to our demands
unless they are backed by the disp,lay of a strong
force of the proper kind to pursue them & their
herds. Yet it is of so much importance that the
principle of surrendering evil doers should be established among these Indians, when all further
trouble with them will cease, that the strongest
efforts ought to be made for it; or failing in this,
so stringent an example should be made as not only
to force the passively well disposed (a majority)
to control the bad, but also to overawe all other
tribes in this Territory, to whom it would soon
become known. If an example is to be made of any
tribe, it will be more likely to succeed with the
Navajoes than with any other in New Mexico.
In the end either of these results will fully
repay any exertions we may now make. 84
In due time Agent Dodge and Lieutenant Alley met the
Navaho at Cariso, sixty miles north of the Fort. The
Indians offered to pay for the dead soldier; the offer was met
by "a reference to our laws, and our determination to execute them in this instance," which meant surrender the
culprit or war would result. And eventually, to the surprise
of the officials, the culprit was surrendered ;85 that is, if the
identification were accurate. Moreover, "Major H L Kendrick and myself at the urgent request of Armijo th.e civil
chief and Sarcillo Largo, the war chief and one hundred
other principal men of the Nation, and after his identity
was proven by a Sergeant and two soldiers, had him hung
84. Kendrick to AAG, 10/8/54, AGO, LR, K15/54.
85. Kendrick to AAG, 10/23/54, AGO, LR, K17/54. The status of chiefs was
not as fixed as the government apparently believed or hoped for.
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until he was dead dead dead."86 Kendrick was well pleased:
"I deem the surrender of this criminal to be a national act
as much as any which the Navajoes are capable of performing-It is the first one of the kind, in their history...."87
The white man's conception of law had been enforced,
but the Navaho profited little from the lesson. In the spring
of 1856 another major incident occurred; a flock of 11,000
sheep, or so it was alleged,88 was stolen and three herders
were killed. The usual pressure was promptly appUed: "As
this is a grave offense you may assure the chiefs and head
men of the tribe, that they must surrender the thieves or
take the consequences."89 The military, however, did not
press the matter vigorously due to lack of troops.90 The responsible Navaho, on the other hand, showed a desire to
pay damages and claimed, as usual, that the wrong doers
were a few of their people who lived with the Utah. By the
end of summer they paid 2,000 sheep, 52 horses, and three
servants for the three dead herders. 91 At a conference held
at Santa Fe in September the surrender of the murderers
was claimed by the Navaho chief to be impossible. "This I
deem a moot point," General Garland replied, "and will so
consider it, and so it will be understood by the Navajo
Nation."92
But the worst part of this episode was the discouragement experienced by the offiCials: Their high hopes aroused
by the so called "national act" of two years before and their
86. Dodge to Meriwether, 11/13/54, OIA, LR, W349/55.
87. 11/11/54; AGO, LR, K19/54.
"The poor have committed a good many small thefts within the last three months
all of which with the assistance of the well disposed and I am happy to say they form
a large majority I have returned so far as they have come to my knowledge." Dodge
to Davis (gov.) 12/26/55, New Mexico Agent Reports, 1850-58.
88. Meriwether to Manypenny, 7/24/56, OIA, LR, N152/56.
89, W. W. H. Davis to Dodge, 4/8/56, OIA, NMS, OL, II, 63.
"The authorities have warned the farmers, as also have the Indians, not to drive
their flocks into the Indian Country, but they still persist in doing, and the consequences must ever be depredations of this kind." Davis to Manypenny, 4/9/56, OIA,
LR, NI04/56.
.
90; AAG to Kendrick, 7/26/56, AGO. LS, IX, 503.
91. Dodge to Manypenny, 9/30/56, OIA, LR, N177/56.
, 92. Garland to AAG, 9/30/56, AGO, LB, X, 20.
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subsequent efforts to promote the welfare .of the Indians had
resulted in disillusionment. The slow process of trying to
change the nomad by word of mouth, of alternating between
explanations of the power of the government and encouragement in the practice of farming, all supplemented by the
giving of presents, seemed futile. "Until they are taught the
power of our government in a manner heretofore unknown
to them, they will never respect it. All idea that. they will
regard one line of the Treaty of Laguna Negra, save those
which refer to the reception of presents, may now be dismissed."93 In fact, the chiefs apparently believed that their
war strength was greater than that of the government.
For the next two years conditions changed little. An
occasional theft occurred and considerable irritation developed over the Fort Defiance grazing grounds. The military 'claimed the hayfields by treaty right, the Navaho
claimed them, by hereditary right. The two parties almost
came to blows iii the summer of 1857 and the pos~ garrison
was reinforced temporarily.94 Happily this crisis passed and
the extra troops were withdrawn without seeing action.
But the time was drawing near when the Navaho were to be
"impressed" with the might of the United States, a' step
that the civil and military, officials in the Territory now
believed to be necessary.
"Still; whatever trouble they make, they are as yet the
best Indians in New Mexico, and if the so called 'humane
policy' is ever to succeed with any large tribe, it is with the
Navajoes. There is no hope of its success until they are
thoroughly convinced of our superior strength."95 With this
analysis we leave these Indians to be convince,d, a lesson
undertaken by the military in the summer of 1858 when a
93. KendJ:'ick to AAG, 6/13/56, AGO, LR, K9/56. Dodge to Medwether, 6/13/56"
OIA. LR, N138/56.
94. Collins to Denver, 6/29/57, OIA. C1l52/57. AAG to Col. W. W. Loring,
7/1/57, AGO, LS, X, 121.
95. KendJ:'ick to Meriwether, 1/25/57, OIA, New Mexico Agent Reports, 1850-1858.
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Navaho sped an arrow between the shoulder blades of a
negro servant of the commander at Fort Defiance. 96
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HISTORICAL REVIEW, July, 1937.

